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István Benczes1
European economic governance through 
fiscal rules
The European Union has been one of the most enthusiastic proponents of fiscal rules. 
Following the European sovereign debt crisis, the EU did not embark on a wide-scale 
governance reform with the aim of creating a fiscal union; rather, it started to cement 
the original architecture that had been built upon fiscal rules. By applying the conceptual 
framework of liberal intergovernmentalism, the article argues that the choice between 
stronger rules on the one hand and deeper fiscal integration on the other hand has been 
basically determined by German preferences. With the help of the simple model of war-
of-attrition, the article shows that core countries managed to strengthen the rules-based 
economic policy framework of the EU to the extreme.
Introduction
The European Union has always been amongst the most enthusiastic proponents of fiscal rules. 
From the time of signing the Maastricht Treaty, several supranational and national fiscal rules have 
been introduced in the member countries of the EU. In fact, the EU has been possibly the most 
vehement proponent of fiscal rules right after the crisis. The European Commission called for stri-
cter rules at the time of the Greek sovereign debt crisis (European Commission 2010a, b), which 
resulted in the adoption of the Six-pack in the first round. But the EU did not stop there; a year 
later, in 2012, euro-zone members agreed on the adoption of the so-called Fiscal Compact, which 
was supposed to endorse fiscal discipline at the cost of national sovereignty and which caused a 
dramatic increase in the number of fiscal rules used at the national level. In fact, the adoption of 
rules has become the norm in the EU, while discussions on a fiscal union have simply evaporated.2
This study focuses on the European Union and its member states and raises the question why 
there has been a seemingly constant interest in adopting newer and stricter fiscal rules following 
the debt crisis on both the supranational and especially the national level? Why has the crisis trig-
gered a renewed interest in imposing a numerical constraint on discretionary fiscal policy? The 
answer to such questions might not be trivial. Explanations for fiscal rules derived from economics 
do not shed light on the striking difference in the number of adopted rules before and after the 
crisis. In fact, the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods have not been different in the sense that 
countries and their politicians might have not become more short-sighted in the post-crisis era 
that would call for stricter fiscal frameworks and rules. Also, time-inconsistency, deficit bias and 
the common pool problem have been nothing new to European economies; such phenomena were 
solidly part of their history well before the crisis as well. Why did then such a relentless interest 
emerge in fiscal rules in basically every single country in the European Union following the crisis?  
1 professor and Director of the Institute of World Economy at Corvinus University of Budapest, 
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2 On fiscal union in the EU, see Csaba (2013), Kutasi (2017).
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The paper argues that while the typical textbook-style economic causes for fiscal profligacy such 
as time inconsistency have certainly not evaporated in the post-crisis era and these can explain at 
least partly the increased interest in adopting fiscal rules, the real cause for such an extraordinary 
multiplication of rules was driven by German interest. Germany was ready to engage in sovereign 
bail-outs on the one hand and in supporting the creation of a permanent rescue mechanism, i.e., 
the European Stability Mechanism, on the other hand, only at the expense of imposing strong 
conditionalities on debt-ridden countries. Such conditionalities, however, went well beyond the 
typical measures of fiscal austerity and/or structural reforms; they also required member countries 
to introduce stricter than ever numerical limits on public spending. Since domestic politics has 
turned out to be hostile to sovereign bail-outs (and especially the Greek bailout), German policy 
makers and Angela Merkel in particular, tried to convincingly demonstrate that German taxpayers’ 
money was given away not for nothing (Emmanouilidis and Möller, 2010). 
In order to give teeth to the argument, the article applies the conceptual framework of liberal 
intergovernmentalism (LI), one of the most well-known (economic) integration theories.3 By 
identifying the converging preferences (stability of the euro-zone) and diverging preferences 
(costs of preserving the single currency) of the member states and by applying the simple model 
of war-of-attrition, the paper argues that Germany (along with other core countries) managed to 
strengthen the rules-based economic policy framework of the EU to the extreme.
Liberal intergovernmentalism and the sovereign bail-outs
Liberal intergovernmentalism has become a reference point in integration theories due to 
its theoretical coherence and robust, empirics-based relevance. LI, as a theoretical synthesis or 
framework, is acclaiming the status of a general social theory, which is not merely a theory of Eu-
ropean regional integration (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009). Liberal intergovernmental-
ism is an unrelenting contender of other major explanations on European integration. It contests 
the realist claim that European integration would be the ultimate consequence of geopolitics 
(Waltz 1979, Mearscheimer 1990). It also dismisses the federalist view that a unifying Europe 
would wind up nationalism (Pinder 1986). LI does not find the explanation of Milward (1992) 
too convincing either, as it claims that the integration project was not simply an attempt to save 
European nation states. Most importantly, it refuses the neofunctionalist understanding of Eu-
ropean integration (Haas 1958), which concentrates on the intimate relationship between high 
politics and low politics and emphasizes the (almost sole) importance of supranational elites.
The unit of analysis is the (nation) state and not the EU per se. States, however, do not act 
in a vacuum; they try to articulate their interests through different means, especially interstate 
bargaining. In European integration, states are the ultimate masters of the treaty. States, being 
rational, utility-maximiser actors, base all their decisions on a strict cost-benefit analysis and 
choose amongst different alternatives accordingly (i.e. cooperating with others or not). Any in-
ternational agreement or institution is ultimately the output of substantive interstate bargaining 
(Moravcsik 1998). 
3 On LI versus neofunctionalism, see amongst others Vigvári (2017).
KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2016/3134 9
Liberal intergovernmentalism has not yet exhaustively reacted to the European sovereign 
debt crisis. There has been one solid exception, though, to this trend. Schimmelfennig (2015) 
framed a typical intergovernmentalist problem: converging national preferences on the most-
preferred outcome (i.e., preserving the single currency and the EMU itself) on the one hand and 
diverging preferences with regard to the distribution of costs of the Pareto-optimal solution on 
the other hand. In consequence, while each member state, including the crisis-hit economies, 
agreed on the maintenance of EMU and disfavoured the option of the fall apart of the euro-zone, 
the asymmetric nature of interdependence amongst EMU member counties has given birth to 
such an institutional design and burden-sharing which exclusively reflected German (and its 
allies’) preferences. The situation is described by Schimmelfennig (2015) as a “chicken game”, 
referring to hard interstate negotiations and brinkmanship. 
The typical preference-ordering of a chicken game is the following:
DC > CC > CD > DD,
where D refers to defection and C to cooperation (and the first letter refers to the preference 
of the first actor, while the second letter refers to the second actor’s preference).
The chicken game is similar to the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), as the Pareto optimal outcome 
(mutual cooperation, CC) is not the equilibrium in any of the two games; yet, CC is strictly pre-
ferred to mutual defection (DD).4 In contrast to the PD, however, the chicken game has multiple 
equlibria and, in turn, it does not have a dominant strategy.5 The chicken game is often used in 
the context of conflictual and violent situations like the Iranian nuclear programme (Sadjadpour 
2007) or the invasion of Iraq by the US or Russia’s aggression against the Ukraine. Some of the 
trade negotiations, especially when one party has to take unilateral concessions, can be described 
by a chicken game, too (Aggarwal and Dupont 2008).
Schimmelfennig (2015) provided a couple of points for demonstrating the rightness of the chic-
ken game analogy. First, each and every country tried to avoid the worst outcome, i.e., the disin-
tegration of the EMU (DD). Keeping the single currency alive and introducing reforms (CC) was 
strictly preferred to the collapse of EMU, because each participant could only gain with the euro. 
Second, the chicken game – in harmony with LI – has a distributional conflict, too: actors must ag-
ree on how the burdens of crisis management are distributed. The highest payoffs (DC) come only 
if one actor can force the other one to take the costs. The other one loses but is still alive; that is, it 
can remain in the EMU (CD). Third, the chicken game is also adequately descriptive with regard to 
actors’ irrationality, which Schimmelfennig addressed as brinkmanship. That is, actors try to send 
signals that they lost control over events in order to deter others. 
While the chicken game could be a good starting point in explaining crisis management by 
revealing diverging preferences on outcome, it might not be the most appropriate choice for un-
derstanding the actions, and more importantly the lack of actions, of member states in the post-
4 Preference ordering of the PD: 
  DC > CC > DD > CD
5 The Nash equilibrium of PD is DD.
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crisis situation. It is argued in this article, instead, that national governments have been steadily 
engaged in a game of “war-of-attrition”. 
“War-of-attrition” is often called the “game of timing”, as it has two major defining characte-
ristics: (1) the winner’s payoff is greater than the loser’s payoff; and more importantly, (2) payoffs 
do deteriorate as time passes. While the first characteristic is obvious, the second one underlines 
that actors choose to wait instead of acting even if their reluctance to act implies a significant 
decline in net payoffs. Waiting (insisting on the status quo) is basically the consequence of infor-
mational asymmetry amongst partners: actors are well-informed about their own stakes but are 
unaware of other parties’ payoffs. If actors opt to wait, the question is how long it is worth waiting 
for (and thus foregoing the benefits of an immediate action) in order to win the game and force 
the other party to take all the costs. This approach is therefore rather useful in cases where the 
challenge is to reveal different bargaining strategies over time when the status quo deteriorates.6
In the war-of-attrition amongst the members of the European Union, two distinct groups 
could be identified. The crisis-hit economies, often called the periphery or the PIIGS, referring to 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain on the one hand and the Northern or core economies 
(e.g., Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland) on the other hand. Both the periphery 
and the core agreed on the priority of maintaining the stability of the euro-zone as the Pareto-
optimal outcome (Moravcsik 2012, Schimmelfennig 2015) but the two groups definitely did not 
manage to agree on the distribution of adjustment costs.
At the periphery, countries tried to minimize the cost of crisis management and to shift as 
much of the burden of crisis management as possible onto the core. Practically they wanted two 
things: 1) the core taxpayers to pay the bill, and 2) to commit themselves to as soft reforms as 
possible due to the associated political and social consequences of any consolidation that would 
imply a change in the prevailing status quo. At first glance, it might be trivial to assume that the 
troubled nations did not have too much to offer for the others; therefore, the core could easily en-
force its terms and conditions on the crisis-hit economies. But this was not necessarily the case. 
Troubled nations can always threat others with exit or default (the worst-case outcome, DD, that 
both groups though wanted to avoid since CC>DD), thereby destabilizing the whole euro-zone. 
The crisis-hit economies never really wanted to abandon the single currency and return to 
their national currencies. An exit would have practically resulted in a devastating effect on the 
troubled nations, since the public debt would have (still) been denominated in euro, whereas all 
(future) income would have been accrued in national currencies (Eichengreen 2007). In fact, 
any country that decides to leave the EMU should, in principle, decline its EU-membership, too, 
which makes such a scenario rather unlikely. Nevertheless, exit and especially the threat of an 
exit can substantially strengthen the bargaining position of the periphery, because an exit can 
significantly endanger the stability of the euro-zone. Default has never been a desired option 
either, as it always entails a huge economic and social burden. Also, a default may undermine the 
stability of the whole currency area, as other countries may also become the target of speculative 
attacks of international financial markets. Yet, default is once again a valid option for threatening 
6 One of the most widely known applications of the war-of-attrition model is Alesina and Drazen (1991) in 
the economics literature. The authors showed that coalition governments react only slowly or not at all to 
fiscal shocks, so stabilisation is delayed, thereby placing extra burden/costs on society.
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the core and enforcing them to surrender (in technical terms, surrendering in a war-of-attrition 
game means that the marginal cost of extra waiting equals its marginal benefit).
Furthermore, strict conditionalities attached to financial rescue can always be softened by 
referring to “unexpected circumstances”. Implementing only partial reforms is always a possible 
and rational strategy in a waiting game. The core might have wanted the periphery to get enga-
ged in taking as much fiscal consolidation as possible, but Germany and its allies had to be rather 
cautious about their demands with regard to fiscal, financial and structural reforms. If the cost of 
reform was politically and economically untenable, thereby alienating the periphery, the whole 
situation could have eventually deteriorated into default or a total abandonment of EMU mem-
bership. In this sense, partial reforms are always better than no reforms at all and much better 
than a country’s collapse or a possible collapse of the whole euro-zone.
Last but not least, PIIGS have had an immense interest in allying with the European Com-
mission in its attempt to mutualize public debt. The common issuance of sovereign bonds could 
have been a clear supranational solution of crisis management, proposed by the European Com-
mission (2011) and backed by France under Sarkozy; yet Germany never gave credit to a eu-
ro-bond due to the assumed endorsement of moral hazard. Nevertheless, the very idea of debt 
mutualization, a much-refuted option by the Germans was (or could have been) a card in the 
hands of the periphery.
Core countries also tried to minimize (their) costs during crisis management. The core had 
to solve a puzzle, though. A financial rescue is an explicit violation of the so-called no-bail-out-
clause of TFEU (Article 125 (1)), which says that no member state or the EU itself can rescue 
another country. The no-bail-out clause was placed in the Treaty for a very good reason. It was 
rightly assumed that financial rescue could strengthen moral hazard in a currency union, mak-
ing countries less reluctant to claim special status at times of difficulties. Abandoning the article 
had certain costs in terms of weakened credibility (a point that the core has always tried to 
avoid). The solution to such a dilemma was to grant the first Greek bailout package upon the as-
sumption of “extraordinary circumstances” that were beyond the control of the Greek authorities 
(Council regulation 96/06/2010). 
In the chicken game, the winner takes it all (DC). In a waiting game, both the winner’s and 
the loser’s payoff deteriorate over time. This is exactly what happened in the first Greek rescue 
negotiations. On the one hand, Greece tried to demonstrate its ability to cope with the crisis and 
to avoid default or leaving the euro-zone. It took almost half a year for the Papandreau govern-
ment to officially ask for (and accept) the financial assistance of the EU and the IMF (Benczes 
and Benczes 2018). Right from the beginning, it was clear to Greek politicians that any official 
rescue would be granted on a conditional basis only, making the agreement politically risky. 
They turned to the EU/IMF at the point where the cost of additional waiting would have been 
unacceptable, because in that case Greece would have found itself in a disorderly default, which 
was the worst case scenario.
On the other hand, the EU, dominated by Germany, was obviously aware of the Greek si-
tuation, but it did not want to commit itself to an early rescue with soft conditionalities. At that 
point, waiting was still less costly than striking a deal. By delaying the agreement and playing 
tough with Greece, Germany managed to lock Greece in an agreement with strict conditionali-
ties that met the preferences of the German public. Germany’s concern was not Greece itself but 
the stability of the euro-zone and the integrity of the single market. Germany decided to sign 
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the agreement only when the conditions deteriorated considerably throughout the euro-zone, 
following the downgrading of Greek sovereign bonds to junk status in late April. By that point it 
became evident that it was not rational to wait any longer. 
Generally speaking, with the application of strict conditionalities, core countries wanted to 
strongly commit crisis-hit economies to crisis management. By strict conditionalities the core, 
and especially Germany did not mean solely fiscal austerity of competitiveness-enhancing struc-
tural reforms. They also wanted the periphery and the whole euro-zone, in fact, to engage in the 
adoption of extremely strict numerical fiscal rules where the sanctioning of non-compliance 
would happen automatically in the future. The means to this end was the adoption of the Fiscal 
Compact, an intergovernmental treaty of the euro-zone members which were joined by some 
other non-euro-zone economies, too.
Fiscal rules and German interests
Germany has evidently taken the leadership position in EU crisis management. It was rather 
clear since day one of the eruption of the European sovereign debt crisis that Germany was to 
play a major role in overcoming the crisis. But Germany was willing to agree to use its own tax-
payers’ money to bail out failing states, and thereby go against the no bailout clause, under strict 
conditions only such as the ones enshrined in the Fiscal Compact. 
The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(aka the Fiscal Compact) was adopted in March 2012 and came into force on January 1, 2013. 
As a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, the EU enacted the so-called Six-pack in 2011; 
but Germany was not fully content with the new rules of the Six-pack; it wanted to stop fiscal 
profligacy in euro-zone member countries once and for all. The Fiscal Compact initiated signi-
ficant changes in at least three respects. It enforced member countries of the euro-zone to adopt 
stronger than ever fiscal rules at the national level targeting balanced budgets.7 The compact also 
asked countries to transpose the new rules into high-level national legislation, most preferably 
into constitution.8 It also authorised the Court of Justice of the European Union to step in in case 
of non-compliance.9
7 “The budgetary position of the general government of a Contracting Party shall be balanced or in surplus” 
(Art. 3 (1a), Fiscal Compact). “The rule under point (a) shall be deemed to be respected if the annual struc-
tural balance of the general government is at its country-specific medium-term objective, as defined in the 
revised Stability and Growth Pact, with a lower limit of a structural deficit of 0.5 % of the gross domestic 
product at market prices” (Art 3 (1b)).
8  “The rules set out in paragraph 1 shall take effect in the national law of the Contracting Parties at the latest 
one year after the entry into force of this Treaty through provisions of binding force and permanent charac-
ter, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the 
national budgetary processes” (Art. 3 (2), Fiscal Compact).
9 According to Art. 8 of the Fiscal Compact, any member state can take another contracting party to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union if the latter happened to ignore the claim of transposing the balan-
ced budget rule along with the correction mechanism into national law, possibly into the constitution. The 
decision of the Court of Justice is binding. The Court may impose a penalty on the non-complying country 
which shall not exceed 0.1 per cent of GDP.
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The Fiscal Compact caters to German needs by introducing strict rules in a way that any later 
bailout is contingent on the party having joined the pact (only those failing member states can 
get ESM funding who have ratified the compact too). Germany itself sacrificed its own widely 
acclaimed fiscal rule (the German golden rule) it had been using for nearly four decades in order 
to first implement what it later required the other members to put into effect in the whole EU. 
The German debt brake of 2009, which is practically equivalent to the budget balance rule of 
the Fiscal Compact, limited the room of manoeuvre of German fiscal policy – with two thirds 
majority political support – following a thorough and comprehensive constitutional process. 
The German constitutional court had called on German parties repeatedly to change the earlier 
golden rule, as well as some provisions of the fiscal constitution, as they had caused legal disputes 
more and more frequently.10 In Germany the reason for a comprehensive constitutional reform 
was thus not just overspending on the regional level and the consequent request of particular 
states for bailout funds from the federal government, but also the risk of such behaviour beco-
ming the accepted norm in the country and the moral hazard it would bring about (Feld and 
Baskaran, 2010).
It was the crisis hitting Europe in 2008 that brought a sweeping change in the protracted 
constitutional process. Germany committed itself to deficit financing, but by laying down the 
new rule in the constitution it sent the clear signal to financial markets that its extravagancy is 
only temporary. Combining crisis resolution with the introduction of the new rule laid down in 
2009 was to demonstrate that Germany did have an exit strategy.11
Germany wanted to transplant its own mechanism onto other member states of the Eu-
ropean Union as well. By 2011, the steadily increasing Spanish, Portuguese and Irish risk premia 
were threatening the stability of the whole eurozone. The creation of the temporary bailout me-
chanisms such as the EFSF did not convince international financial markets. In turn, by early 
2011, Germany no longer objected to setting up a permanent bailout mechanism (Beach, 2013). 
The question was, however, how to sell such an idea to domestic voters and how to ensure that 
a permanent bailout mechanism did not help embed moral hazard in the euro-zone. The Fiscal 
Compact seemed to be the right means to do this job as it has connected two pillars that have 
been considered to be important for economic governance in the eyes of Germany. The compact 
has introduced strict rules, and afforded the opportunity to lay down the foundations of transfer 
mechanisms. It is beyond doubt that the compact is about the tightening up of fiscal rules, but 
from a German perspective it was just as important to make sure that only countries that join 
the Fiscal Compact should be made eligible for financial assistance from the European Stability 
10 Several German states especially Saarland, Bremen, and the capital city of Berlin were hoping to get ba-
ilout funds from federal sources. In these legal disputes it was the constitutional court that had to decide 
which federal land could get fiscal transfer and which could not.
11 The German debt brake limits the structural deficit at 0.35 percent at federal level – as opposed to 0.5 
percent in the Fiscal Compact. Originally, the new German rule was not supposed to be applied to the 
individual federal states. However, due to the crisis it was also extended to them as well (requiring them to 
have a balanced budget). Nevertheless, while at federal level the starting date is 2016, at state level the new 
rule is to be applied from 2020 only.
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Mechanism.12 The German type of brakes laid down in the constitutions also helped to make it 
easier to sell future bailouts more easily to the German public politically. This way the message 
of the compact could be more in accordance with German intentions, i.e., that any bailout or the 
possibility thereof could not under any circumstances carry the moral hazard of becoming inhe-
rent. And as Table 1 demonstrates, EU countries have been indeed busy with adopting new rules 
following the crisis – most of these changes came right after (or together with) the ratification 
processes of the Fiscal Compact in 2012.
Table 1. Fiscal rules in use in the euro-zone (year of introduction)
Balanced-budget rule Debt rule Expenditure rule Revenue rule
Austria 2015 2015
Belgium 2003, 2014 2016
Cyprus 2014 2015
Germany 1990, 2013
Estonia 2014 2014
Greece 2014
Spain 2014 2014 2014
Finland 2013, 2014 2014 1999
France 2013 2009
Ireland 2013 2015 2013
Italy 2001, 2010, 2014 2014 2014, 2016
Lithuania 2015, 2016 2012 2015 2015
Luxembourg 2014, 2015
Latvia 2016 2014 2016
Netherlands 2014 2014 2015 1998, 2016
Portugal 2014, 2015, 2016 2013
Slovenia 2015, 2016 2010
Slovakia 2014 2012 2016
Malta 2014 2014
Source: own compilation based on European Commission (2018).
Note: Rules adopted at the federal or state (regional) level plus in the social security system. 
12 In fact, many countries such as Germany itself ratified the ESM Treaty and the Fiscal Compact at the same 
time (de Witte 2011).
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Lamenting on the Fiscal Compact
It is often claimed that the Fiscal Compact has simply been the reinforcement of existing ru-
les; it only restated the ones adopted by the Six-pack – enough to mention the balanced budget 
rule, the focus on debt sustainability or the escape clauses attached to the treaty (ECB 2012). 
Others, however, argue that because the intergovernmental treaty was much tougher than the 
previous EU framework, the current rules will arrange themselves in a clear hierarchy. Suprema-
cy is given to the new structural balance rule of the Fiscal Compact, and the EU rules (the Lisbon 
Treaty and the Six-pack in particular) would provide a sort of safety net to the balanced budget 
rule (Blizkovsky 2012, Verhelst 2012).
Table 2. Order of likelihood of activation of fiscal instruments
Order Legal basis Instrument Parameter Sanction Decision 
on sanction
Participating 
member states
1 TSCG Balanced 
budget rule
Structural 
deficit below 
0.5% of GDP
Penalty up 
to 0.1% of 
GDP
European 
Court of 
Justice
25 (does not 
include CZ 
and UK)
2* TSCG Debt rule 1/20th annual 
reduction of 
debt above 
60% of GDP
N/A N/A 25 (does not 
include CZ 
and UK)
3 EU 
secondary 
legislation
6-pack, Adjustment 
to medium-
term objective 
and excessive 
structural 
deficit over 
0.5% of GDO
From an 
interest-
bearing 
deposit of 
0.2% to 
a fine of 
0.2% of 
GDP
Council 
(reverse 
qualified 
majority 
voting)
27, sanctions 
to 17 (EMU 
members) 
only
4 EU 
primary 
legislation
TFEU 
Article 126, 
Protocol 12
Annual deficit 
below 3% of 
GDP
Up to a 
fine of an 
appropriate 
size
Council 
(qualified 
majority 
voting)
27, sanctions 
to 17 (EMU 
members) 
only
Note: * a similar debt rule is part of the 6 pack rules.
Source: Blizkovsky (2012).
Originally, the EU was built around a “dual constitution, supranational in the single market’s 
policies and intergovernmental in (among others) economic and financial policies” (Fabbrini 
2013: 1003). Accordingly, policies related to the single market have been conducted with the ro-
bust involvement of supranational institutions such as the European Commission and the Court 
of Justice of the European Union. In the case of financial and economic policies, however, an 
intergovernmental mentality has prevailed since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. In con-
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sequence, the Council and the European Council in particular have been solidly involved in 
both crisis management and crisis prevention, i.e., laying down the foundations of the future 
economic governance of the EU. There is no surprise therefore that the Fiscal Compact has been, 
in fact, the result of intergovernmental mentality, strongly backed by the EU’s largest economy. 
The Lisbon Treaty, along with the Stability and Growth Pact, were evidently lacking real ri-
gour and sanctioning. When the foundations of the EMU were laid down in the early nineties, 
no actor involved in the negotiations wanted to restrict sovereignty beyond the surrendering of 
monetary policy. The Maastricht Treaty, back in 1992, was a sort of compromise therefore. The 
Court of Justice of the EU for instance did not have a role at all in the excessive deficit proced-
ure. Even the role of the European Commission was substantially limited in the process (TFEU 
126). The consequence was the total negligence of the Stability Pact as early as 2003. The Fiscal 
Compact, therefore, intended to sign the end of that particular era. It called for the active and 
effective involvement of both the European Commission and the Court of Justice. Strangely 
enough, it was an intergovernmental treaty which managed to restore the authority of these two 
supranational institutions in the field of fiscal policy.
It has been noticed long ago in the scholarly works on political economy that rational poli-
ticians are reluctant to delegate authority over issues which can redistribute rents to their cons-
tituencies (Drazen 2000). Since direct access to distributional resources makes the government 
capable of organising a winning coalition in election times, no rational incumbent has the incen-
tive to weaken its own sovereignty. Alesina and Tabellini (2007) have demonstrated that politici-
ans delegate only those tasks to bureaucrats and (supranational) institutions which require tech-
nical knowledge on the hand and provide little direct benefit to incumbents on the other hand. 
Monetary policy has become an ideal policy area for delegation, since it assumes special skills 
and it is difficult to communicate its direct benefits. The situation is rather different, however, 
with regard to fiscal policy: both taxation and spending can provide ample room for politically 
motivated actions, which are easy to target and communicate. 
While European politicians agreed on the establishing of an independent central bank, they 
have remained very reluctant to give up national authority over fiscal policy. Member states have 
not shown too much interest in authorising the Commission to act on behalf of member states in 
times of an economic crisis, either. Heads of state and government have anxiously tried to keep 
their hands on every single detail of crisis management, thereby reflecting a strong inclination 
toward intergovernmentalism. Though the Fiscal Compact is, in fact, an intergovernmental tre-
aty, it did make a strong leap forward to a more supranational supervision of economic policies 
of member states. The compact is about acknowledging that neither the ECOFIN, nor the Eu-
ropean Council, possesses the capacity and skills to enforce compliance to fiscal rules. In turn, 
the preamble of the treaty calls for the integration of the compact into EU legislation as soon as 
possible.
As a non-EU text, the treaty authorises the contracting parties (their governments) to act as 
the main decision-makers. The European Commission is, therefore, in a rather strange situation. 
On the one hand, it cannot have a decisive role in implementing the treaty. On the other hand, 
neither the Council, nor the European Council has the capacity and the skill to monitor the 
compliance of rules by national governments. Therefore, the intergovernmental treaty calls for 
the substantial involvement of the European Commission in the implementation of the proced-
ures of the treaty. Such a schizophrenic situation, however, can easily culminate in non-transpa-
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rent and non-accountable activities and decisions. The further increase of democratic deficit will 
not make the treaty attractive for many, and may even be the target of harsh criticism later on, 
undermining overall its credibility. 
The single most important problem with the Fiscal Compact could be though the fact that 
the crisis itself was not triggered by the lack of discipline of incumbents. It is well-known by now 
that except for Greece, EU countries did refrain from fiscal laxity before the crisis; they did not 
accumulate huge deficits or debts. Ireland had a debt-to-GDP ratio less than half of that of the 
60% limit. But Spain and Portugal also managed to keep their debt dynamics within constraints. 
Fiscal deficits in these countries jumped to unlikely high levels only as a consequence of cleaning 
off commercial banks’ balance sheets. The contagious effect of the banking crisis was transmitted 
onto the sovereigns, ending up in public debt crisis. De Grauwe (2013) referred to the intimate 
relationship between banks and sovereigns as “the deadly embrace”.
Bailing out banks was officially left to the national government after the decision of the Eu-
ropean Council in October 2008, just one month after the collapse of Lehmann Brothers. Ho-
wever, the banking sector had grown incredibly large, thanks to the success of the single market 
project. At the extreme, total banking assets were eight times that of the GDP in Ireland. The 
ratio was four in Austria and France, three in Spain and two and a half in Portugal (ECB 2014.) 
Recapitalising the banks meant a huge burden on taxpayers in the crisis-hit economies. Con-
sequently, the debt-to-GDP ratio was elevated by ca. 100% of the GDP in Ireland. What is now 
called as the European debt crisis, therefore, emerged not as a result of the mismanagement of 
public finances. It was an unintended consequence of tackling the first wave of the 2008 global 
financial crisis. It was the private sector, and not the public sector, which triggered the crisis. 
Consequently, it is highly unlikely that a treaty like the Fiscal Compact could have prevented the 
eruption of the crisis of 2008. Since the roots of the crisis stemmed not from the public sector, the 
Fiscal Compact cannot provide a real shelter from skyrocketing deficit and debt ratios. 
It is always true in an open economy that 
 (X–M) = (S–I) + (T–G)       (1) 
       
where X stands for export, M is import, S and I are the savings and investment of the private 
sector, whereas T denotes taxes and G governmental spending. 
Equation (1) demonstrates that the external balance can deteriorate even if the public sector 
is in balance (T=G). Investment exceeding savings culminates in trade deficit – as was the case 
in countries at the periphery. If both the external position and the general government are in ba-
lance (or close to balance), the private sector will be in a balanced position too, and no domestic 
savings would be exceeded by private investments. But is it reasonable to assume that both the 
public and the private sectors are in balanced positions at the same time? In federal states (or in 
a common currency union) it is not rare at all that certain regions (states) have very different 
positions due to both cyclical and structural factors, the latter including economic development, 
competitiveness, etc. In turn, the EMU can either accept that disequlibria cannot be prevented 
to emerge and creates a permanent transfer mechanism in order to reduce the likeliness of the 
occurrence of a crisis, or it institutionalises such mechanisms that can guarantee the balanced 
position of each of the three parts of equation (1). In the current circumstances, the fiscal com-
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pact can be successful only if it is supplemented by another pact that focuses on the stability of 
the private sector. Mody (2013) for instance urged the adoption of a banking and a competitive-
ness pact besides the Fiscal Compact. 
Conclusion
Following the German unification, Germany became the strongest player in the European 
arena. Nevertheless, it never really acted (or even imitated to act) as a hegemon. Germany re-
mained the strongest supporter of integration in the post-Maastricht era, always ready to pay the 
bill of deepening or enlarging the EU. Yet it always let France and/or the European Commission 
to take the leading role in the design of the integration process. The crisis, however, has brought 
about significant changes to the European landscape. France has become weak both in economic 
and political terms following the crisis and especially under the presidency of Hollande. The UK, 
having not been part of the euro-zone, soon maintained its distance from crisis management and 
started to concentrate solely on its own economic troubles. In 2016, it decided to leave the EU 
eventually. The European Commission under Barroso did not seem to be willing to become the 
agenda setter either (Wyplosz 2012).
Applying the vocabulary of LI, the asymmetric nature of interdependence has dramatically 
increased in the EU, finding Germany in a rather new and unusual position of a “reluctant” hege-
mon, a position that was more rather the consequence of circumstances than intention (Bulmer 
and Paterson 2013). Paradoxically, Germany should have provided stability financed by German 
resources when domestic politics shifted away from unconditional support to European integra-
tion. National preferences in Germany, by and large, have become seriously anti-bail out or even 
anti-Greek (Schweiger 2015).
What is considered by many commentators as the lack of solidarity and simply as a failed 
policy (Jones 2010, Summers 2015), or as a series of rational and calculated decisions (Beck 
2014), has a rather different reading in the eyes of German policymakers. For the latter, the strict 
position of the German cabinet has been interpreted as the clearest effort to stabilise the euro-
zone; all these decisions were considered as the right steps toward rescuing the single currency. 
Accordingly, Angela Merkel’s main duty has been to enforce all those rules and procedures that 
the successful European integration was based upon (Janning and Möller 2016). As the EU is not 
a sovereign like the USA, its member states’ activities have to be coordinated by mutually respec-
ted rules, procedures, and formal and informal institutions. From such a perspective, the Greek 
or whatever bail-out is simply the violation of the Lisbon Treaty. Or more generally: the under-
mining of the norms of the union. Strict conditionalities are accordingly not part of the wishful 
thinking of Germany, but constitute rather the interest of the EU itself. What critics interpret as 
reluctance or lack of solidarity is, in fact, the firm position of Germany on defending European 
values. In turn, Germany’s Europapolitik might not necessarily be inconsistent, and might not be 
lacking of strategic orientation at all. 
KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2016/3144 9
References
Aggarwal, V. K. – C. Dupont (2008): Collaboration and co-ordination in the global political eco-
nomy, in: Ravenhill, J. (ed.): Global political economy. Oxford University Press, 2008, 67-94.
Alesina, Alberto –  Drazen, Allen (1991): Why are stabilizations delayed? American Economic 
Review, 81:5, 1170-1188.
Alesina, Alberto – Tabellini, Guido (1997): Bureaucrats of politicians: Part I: A single policy task. 
American Economic Review, 97:1, 169-179.
Beck, Ulrich (2014) The reflexive moderniztaion of democracy. In: Gagnon, Jean-Paul (ed.) de-
mocratic theorists in conversation: Turns in contemporary thoughts. Palgrave MacMillan, 
Basingstoke, 85-100.
Blizkovsky, Peter (2012): Does the golden rule translate into a golden EU economic governance? 
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Policy Brief Series No. 7.
Bulmer, Simon (1983): Domestic politics and European Community policy-making. Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 21/4 (1983), 349-363.
Bulmer, Simon – Paterson, W. E. (2013): Germany as the EU’s reluctant hegemon? Of economic 
strength and political constraints. Journal of European Public Policy, 20:10, 1387-1405.
Csaba László (2013) Európai Egyesült Államokat - de most rögtön? (United States of Europe - 
right now?) Köz-gazdaság, 8: 1, 19-27.
De Grauwe, Paul (2013) Design failures in the eurozone: Can they be fixed? Europe in question. 
LSE Discussion Paper Series No. 57.
De Witte, Bruno (2011) The European treaty amendment for the creation of a financial stability 
mechanism. Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies Issue 2001:6epa.
Drazen, Allen (2000) Political economy in macroeconomics. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University 
Press.
ECB (2014) Statistic pocket book. Franfurt: ECB.
ECB (2012) Monthly bulletin. May. Frankfurt: ECB, 79-93.
Eichengreen, Barry (2007): The breakup of the euro area, NBER Working Paper No. 13393, Wa-
shington DC.
Emmanouilidis, Janis és Almut Möller (2010) General perception of EU integration: Accomo-
dating a ’New Germany’. In: Dehousse, Renaud – Elvire Fabry (szerk.) Where is Germany 
heading? Notre Europe, Studies and Reports 79, 3-12.
European Commission (2018) Numerical fiscal rules in the EU member states. European Com-
mission, Brussels. Downloadable from: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indica-
tors/fiscal_governance/fiscal_rules/index_en.htm
European Commission (2011): Green Paper on the feasibility of introducing stability bonds, 
COM(2011) 818. Brussels, 23 November 2011.
European Commission (2010a) Commission communication of 12 May 2010 on Reinforcing 
economic policy coordination. 12 May 2010. 
European Commission (2010b) Commission communication of 30 June 2010 on Enhancing 
economic policy coordination for stability, growth and jobs – Tools for stronger EU econo-
mic governance. 30 June 2010. 
Fabbrini, Sergio (2013) Intergovernmentalism and its limits: Assessing the European Union’s 
answers to the euro crisis. Comparative Political Studies, 46(9), 1003–1029.
BLAHÓ ANDRÁS KÖSZÖNTÉSE 145INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MULTIDISCIPLINARY DOCTORAL SCHOOL
Feld, Lars P. – Baskaran, Thushyanthan (2010): Federalism, budget deficits and public debt: On 
the reform of Germany’s fiscal constitution. Review of Law and Economics, 6:3, 365–393.
Haas, Ernst (1958)  The uniting of Europe: Political, social, and economic forces, 1950-1957. Stan-
ford University Press.
Janning, Josef – Almut Möller (2016) Leading from the centre: Germany’s new role in Europe. 
European Council on Foreign Relations. Policy Brief, July, London. 
Jones, Erik (2010) Merkel’s folly. Survival 52 (3), 21-38.
IMF (2017) Fiscal rules at a glance. Backgroung paper, Washington D.C.
Kindleberger, C.: The world in depression, 1929-1939, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973.
Kutasi Gábor (2017) Fiscal union under unsustainability of public debt. In: Lubor, Lacina and An-
tonin Rusek (eds) Imperative of economic growth n the euro-zone. Vernon Press, New York.
Mearscheimer, John (1990): Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the cold war. Interna-
tional Security, 15:1, 5-56.
Meiers, F-J.: Germany’s role in the euro crisis: Berlin’s quest for a more perfect monetary union, 
Springer, London, 2015.
Milward, Allen (1992): The European rescue of the nation state. Routledge, London, 1992.
Mody, Ahoka (2013) A Schuman compact for the euro area. Bruegel Essay and Lecture Series, 
Brussels: Bruegel Institute.
Moravcsik, Andrew (2012): Europe after the crisis. Foreign Affairs, 91:3, 54-68. 
Moravcsik, Andrew (1998): The choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to 
Maastricht. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1998.
Moravcsik, Andrew – Schimmelfennig, Frank (2009): Liberal intergovernmentalism, in: Wiener, 
A. and T. Diez (eds.) European integration theory. Oxford University Press, 67-88.
Morisse-Schilbach, M.: “Ach Deutschland!” Greece, the euro crisis, and the costs and benefits of 
being a benign hegemon, in: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 14/1 (2011), 28-41.
Pinder, John (1986) The political economy of integration in Europe: Policies and institutions in 
East and West. Journal of Common Market Studies 25:1. 
Sadjadpour, K.: The nuclear players, in: Journal of International Affairs, 60/2 (2007), 125-134.
Schimmelfennig, Frank (2015) Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis, in: Journal 
of European Public Policy, 22:2, 177-195.
Summers, Lawrence (2015) Greece is Europe’s failed state in the waiting. Financial Times, 20. 
June 2015.
Verhelst, Stijn (2012) How EU fiscal norms will become a safety net for the failure of national 
golden rules? European Policy Brief, No. 6.
Vigvári Gábor (2017) Transforming a trilemma into a dilemma: A political economic approach to 
the recent crises in Europe. Annals of the University of Oradea Economic Science 26: 1, 713-722. 
Waltz, Kenneth (1979) Theory of international politics. McGraw Hill, New York
